Nairobi Governor Johnson Sakaja signed a cooperation agreement with President William Ruto at State House, Nairobi, that has already drawn scrutiny from political leaders who warn the deal could undermine county autonomy and devolution as entrenched in the Constitution.

Against this backdrop, the following highlights 12 key potential loopholes in the agreement that critics say raise serious red flags about its structure and impact of the deal signed on Tuesday, 17 February 2026.

De facto transfer of core county functions without following the Article 187 procedure

Although the Agreement states it “does not constitute a transfer of functions,” it assigns collaboration over refuse management, county roads, markets, housing, and water under Clause 3.2. These are core county mandates under the Fourth Schedule, yet no Article 187 transfer process is invoked.

National government dominance in the steering committee (governor, not chair) Clause 5.4 establishes a Steering Committee chaired by the Prime Cabinet Secretary (Musalia Mudavadi), with the Governor (Johnson Sakaja) as Vice-Chair, alongside multiple Cabinet Secretaries and the Attorney General – placing the County in a structurally subordinate position.

The broad ‘such other areas’ clause allows unchecked expansion of scope. Clause 3.2(vi) permits collaboration in ‘such other areas’ as parties may determine, creating open-ended authority without defined limits.

No clear cost-sharing formula

Clause 7.1 provides that financing modalities shall be ‘jointly agreed’, but sets no cost-sharing ratios or funding framework.

No clarity on procurement

Clause 4.1(vii) references procurement laws but does not designate which level of government leads procurement or owns completed assets.

Blurred accountability

Clauses 4 and 5 create joint implementation structures without clearly allocating ultimate responsibility.

Weak oversight provisions

The agreement does not expressly require County Assembly ratification or structured reporting to it.

Public participation timing and adequacy unclear

Clause 6.1 states the agreement “shall be subjected” to public participation but does not specify whether this precedes or follows execution.

Dispute resolution is limited to the IGR Technical Committee (no clear judicial pathway).

Clause 14.1 confines disputes to negotiation and referral to the Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee.

Six-month termination clause limits political flexibility

Clause 8.2 requires six months’ notice for termination, with ongoing obligations surviving.

Annual reporting bypasses County Assembly (focuses on executive structures).

Clause 7.5 mandates reporting to the National Cabinet and County Executive Committee – not the Assembly.

High political optics risk of undermining devolution

Collectively, these provisions risk perceptions of centralisation contrary to Articles 6(2) and 174 of the Constitution.