Russia’s assertive re-entry into Africa, particularly in West Africa, marks a significant evolution in its foreign policy strategy.

Far from mere nostalgia for Cold War influence, Moscow’s actions reflect a pragmatic and revisionist agenda aimed at undermining Western dominance and asserting itself as a central player in global affairs.

This re-engagement is most visible through security deployments, resource-linked diplomacy, and anti-Western narratives in states such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic.

These partnerships that are often forged in the context of political instability are transactional, favouring regime survival over democratic norms and long-term sovereignty. 

A core instrument in Russia’s West African strategy has been its use of private military companies, notably the Wagner Group and its successors.

Offering a blend of security assistance, disinformation, and economic deals, especially in mining, Russia fills the vacuum left by waning Western influence.

The appeal is immediate: unconditioned support in exchange for access to resources and loyalty in multilateral forums.

This arrangement, however, undermines governance, embeds foreign militarisation in domestic affairs, and weakens institutions, setting a precedent that may ripple across the continent. 

For the African Union (AU), this presents an existential dilemma. The AU’s foundational principle of “African solutions to African problems” is compromised when external actors increasingly define security and governance frameworks.

The proliferation of Russian-backed regimes in West Africa risks undermining African unity, particularly if these states undermine ECOWAS (as already witnessed) or resist AU-led peace and security mechanisms.

Without a coherent response, the AU may find itself sidelined, unable to enforce standards or mediate in crises shaped by external powers. 

The implications for East Africa, and for Kenya in particular, are equally concerning. Traditionally aligned with the West, Kenya’s security architecture and diplomatic ethos contrast sharply with the direction taken by Moscow’s African partners.

This divergence may entrench a continental fault line, weakening Africa’s collective position in global negotiations on climate, finance, and governance.

Moreover, Russia’s military-business model threatens to export a precedent that may tempt fragile East African states to pursue bilateral military deals over regional peace frameworks.  

Kenya should also contend with Russia’s growing strategic interest in the Red Sea.

The planned naval base in Port Sudan signals Moscow’s intent to secure maritime access, potentially threatening East Africa’s trade routes and diminishing Kenya’s role as a logistics and diplomatic hub.

Alongside similar moves by China and the Gulf states, Russia’s presence could intensify geopolitical competition in the Horn, raising the stakes for regional security. 

In this context, Kenya and the broader East African Community (EAC) must respond with strategic clarity.

First, regional resilience must be enhanced through diversified economic partnerships, investments in food and energy security, and greater intra-regional trade.

Second, a principled but non-aligned diplomatic posture is essential, one that evaluates foreign offers not only by their immediate benefits, but by their long-term impact on sovereignty and governance.

Third, Kenya should strengthen good governance, inclusive development, and institutional transparency to reduce vulnerability to disinformation and exploitative deals. 

At the continental level, Kenya should champion AU reform to strengthen oversight over foreign security agreements and prevent further fragmentation.  

The writer is a foreign policy Analyst and a Doctoral Candidate in international studies