Kenya’s first locally assembled smartphones—Neon Ultra and Neon Smarta were launched in October 2023 with government support and private-sector backing.

They were meant to offer affordable access and reduce dependence on imports. Less than two years later, Neon’s market share has collapsed, and Kenyan consumers have walked away from the brand.

The East Africa Device Assembly Kenya (EADAK) facility was commissioned by President William Ruto on October 30, 2023.

Backed by Safaricom, Jamii Telecom, and Shenzhen TeleOne, the plant in Athi River was designed to produce up to three million smartphones annually.

At launch, the Neon Smarta retailed at Ksh7,499, while the Neon Ultra went up to Ksh11,500.

By December 2023, over 194,000 units had been assembled. The government projected 1.4 million devices for 2024.

Despite initial momentum, StatCounter data shows Neon’s market share declined from 2.09 per cent in November 2023 to 0.68 per cent by June 2025.

In the same period, Samsung surged past 30 per cent, TECNO retained 13.4 per cent, Infinix held 7.6 per cent, and Xiaomi and Oppo stayed above 7 per cent.

Even Apple, with premium pricing, secured 4.97 per cent, while Neon fell below 1 per cent.

The market spoke clearly: the product failed to meet consumer expectations.

The first problem was pricing. Government officials initially promised a $40 smartphone—roughly Ksh5,500 at launch. Instead, Neon devices entered the market at nearly double that price.

The Ksh9,999 price tag for the Neon Ultra 2 placed it in direct competition with entry-level phones from Infinix, itel, and Redmi.

These competitors offered better specifications: more RAM, larger batteries, higher-quality cameras, and faster processors. Neon did not match them.

Secondly, the devices lacked performance.

The Neon Smarta shipped with 2 GB RAM, 32 GB storage, a 5 MP camera, and a basic processor. The Neon Ultra offered an 8 MP rear camera and a larger screen, but failed to deliver on speed or efficiency.

Most budget smartphones in 2024 shipped with at least 4 GB RAM, 64 GB storage, and dual cameras.

Consumers buying a smartphone for Ksh10,000 expected more. Neon fell short.

Third, the brand had no credibility. TECNO, Infinix, and itel spent years building distribution and after-sales networks in Kenya.

Samsung and Xiaomi provided reliable software updates and visible support centres.

Neon lacked both. There were no accessible repair services, no warranty ecosystem, and no track record of performance.

For users, especially those with limited disposable income, trust in brand and service matters. Neon didn’t earn it.

Fourth, Neon stagnated. After the initial 2023 launch, there were no follow-up models, no incremental upgrades, and no software improvements.

In contrast, Infinix, TECNO, and Redmi released new models every quarter. By mid-2025, the Neon devices were outdated.

Consumers want devices that evolve. Neon remained static.

Fifth, marketing and distribution were weak. The launch relied heavily on government publicity.

There was no targeted marketing campaign, no influencer engagement, no partnerships with e-commerce platforms like Jumia or Kilimall, and no retail visibility beyond Safaricom stores.

Neon did not penetrate youth culture, urban markets, or informal retail channels. The brand never became part of the daily consumer landscape.

The decline of Neon is not surprising. It reflects a mismatch between policy ambition and market execution.

Manufacturing smartphones is not enough. Success depends on competitive pricing, consumer-informed design, iterative product development, reliable support, and strong distribution.

Neon failed on all counts.

The EADAK plant remains operational, and the vision of local smartphone production is still viable.

Kenya has the infrastructure, skilled workforce, and market demand to support localised assembly.

But future efforts must focus on delivering products that users actually want: fast, durable, affordable smartphones with clear upgrade paths and responsive support.

Without that, local production will not translate to market success.

Kenyans are rational buyers. They prioritise value, not patriotic slogans. They compare specifications, assess usability, and factor in service reliability.

Neon didn’t lose because it was Kenyan—it lost because it didn’t offer a compelling reason to choose it over established alternatives.

If the goal is to build a viable Kenyan smartphone brand, the next phase must treat the consumer as the starting point.

Neon’s failure should inform—not discourage—future innovation. But ambition must be matched with execution grounded in real user needs, competitive benchmarking, and market-tested strategy.

The fall of Neon is not a rejection of local industry—it is a rejection of underwhelming products. Until those gaps are closed, Kenyan consumers will continue to look elsewhere.

The writer is an AI Researcher and Technology Policy Strategist