For Amran Abdundi, a leading women’s rights defender, Saturday mornings meant escaping the inhospitable scorching sun and unfriendly weather and getting time to meet friends and family.
On this particular one, Abdundi was busy conducting her task of visiting the main Garissa market and a local post office.
An international award-winning human rights activist, she receives cases of distress calls and leads a rapid response team to insecure far-flung areas along the Kenya -Somalia border.
“Saturday is a very important day for me as I attend to my chores, weekly shopping, and other errands as I prepare for a new week,” divulges Abdundi.
It was while leaving the post office that she was accosted by two men. They had a message for her from Al-Shabaab.
The Al-Qaeda-linked terror outfit was unhappy with her anti-violent extremism meetings, messaging, and involving women in the fight against terrorism, especially radicalisation and recruitment.
The message was clear: We know your physical address, your daily routine, your relatives and family members, and all the people you communicate with.
“They told me to stop brainwashing and inciting women against Harakat Al-Shabaab and that I should mind my own business,” claims Abdundi.
The human rights activist was shocked by the brazen confidence the two men were displaying. For Abdundi, this was the first time she had come face-to-face with the dangerous Al-Shabaab sympathisers in the 10 years she has been attending to numerous cases of abductions, threats, harassment, cyberbullying, and digital surveillance against journalists and activists perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab group.
“I have attended to many rights violation cases and attacks directed at media personnel and rights advocates in the northern Kenya region. I have worked with communities and authorities in curbing violent extremism but that Saturday morning was dreadful,” the rights activist recalls.
One of the prominent cases Abdundi was handling, involved a female journalist based in Garissa, who was on Al-Shabaab’s radar for two years before she was evacuated from the town to an undisclosed safe house.
The female journalist, Amina Hassan, is a security reporter and researcher on Horn of Africa affairs that involves Al-Shabaab regional leverage, terrorism trends and capabilities. She also does fact-checking, flagging fake online posts and messaging.
Amina had received a Telegram message from one of the Al-Shabaab social media accounts, which threatened her and ordered her to stop her online fact-checking campaigns.
The particular Telegram account used to send threats is also known for spreading messages and information in both Somali and Swahili languages, to escalate misinformation, drive radicalisation and recruit youths. It is instructive to note that the terror network also operated a TikTok account with the same name, which was flagged and brought down.
Many social media accounts associated with the Islamists have been pulled down in an effort spearheaded by the Kenyan Anti-Terror Authority and the telcos. However, rights activists are demanding more robust action from telcos.
“They need to train algorithms on key Somali, English, and Swahili names and terms used on the Al-Shabaab social media platform,” states Qamar Abdi, a women’s rights advocate.
According to a highly-placed official within Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Al-Shabaab uses social media to spread propaganda, misinformation and fake news, and even pass coded messages to its fighters.
Our investigations have unearthed 10 social media accounts that perpetrate misinformation and also spread messages that embolden the recruitment drives in Somalia and the East Africa region. The Tik-Tok accounts, according to our investigation, are associated with the Al-Khataib media wing of Al-Shabaab based in Jilib and other parts of Somalia.
Digital capabilities
The investigation also established that Al-Shabaab has built their own media communication app that is open to their members and those aspiring to join. The Islamist app is meant to offer uninterrupted communication to the jihadists.
“The flagging down and removal of social media accounts belonging to Al-Shabaab has led to them devising and building new communication apps and that tells a lot about the group’s strategic communication plan,” Qamar divulges.
Part of our investigation caught up with a former Al-Shabaab sympathiser, now on the run and has a wealth of information and knowledge about the group as he was a key leader of a local cell operating in the northern part of Kenya and Nairobi.
The former jihadist narrated the digital capabilities of the group and how they equip their local cell members with technological know-how and gadgets.
According to the operator on the run, Al-Shabaab deploys its sympathisers to target key constituents like journalists, security agents, and rights defenders. They do physical surveillance while others from the Al-Aminiyaat outfit conduct digital surveillance and perpetrate digital threats and harassment.
“I was in charge of a team that monitored the work of journalists and rights defenders and issued threats to them through their loved ones, community elders or even accosting the target with threats,” he says.
According to him, the unit in charge of digital surveillance was able to get hold of “targeted” communication and even the social media messaging contents, which is used to blackmail the target.
“Usually, Al-Shabaab’s message to targeted journalists or human rights defenders includes the target’s social media communication and people whom they communicate with frequently,” he warns.
He decided to defect from the group when some of his colleagues were killed on suspicion of espionage.
“I lost a number of my friends who were suspected to be double agents and I decided to remain in Kenya and not fall into a trap of being killed on mere suspicion,” he spoke to this journalist at his hideout.
